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ABSTRACT
1 
 
On  11  and  12  December  the  EU  Summit  may  seal  an  historic  agreement  on  the 
climate action and renewable energy package. At the same time the UN Climate 
Summit in Poznán is drawing to a close. The EU hopes Poznán will give a strong and 
positive signal to ensure negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate change agreement will 
be concluded at the UN Summit in Copenhagen next year. Being the driving force 
within the international climate negotiations, the EU’s leadership role hinges to a 
considerable extent on what it can achieve at home and hence in this case on what 
will  happen  at  the  EU  Summit  in  Brussels.  This  new  paper  discusses  the  EU’s 
international climate change position and its relations with domestic climate change 
policies.  Issues  discussed  are  the  role  of  the  emissions  trading  scheme  in  the 
international carbon market; the potential use of trade measures by the EU when 
trading partners do not take up a carbon commitment; and specific design choices 
of the EU policies with relevance to the international negotiations, such as the new 
baseline year to measure emissions and a distribution of efforts on the basis of the 
prosperity of member states. The paper moreover discusses how the EU conducts 
climate negotiations and argues the  sophisticated system may not be sustainable 
when the EU’s leadership role in the climate negotiations will come under pressure.  
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The  entry  into  force  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  despite  US  opposition,  is  generally 
considered a key diplomatic success for the EU. Negotiating a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol  that  expires  in  2012  is  now  a  top  priority  in  Brussels.  It  is  politically 
important because EU leaders and EU citizens are sincerely concerned about climate 
change. Working towards an effective international and European climate change 
policy  has  moreover  become  a  key  issue  to  demonstrate  the  added  value  of 
European  integration.  On  top  of  that,  there  are  clear  synergies  with  the  EU’s 
concern about its reliance on fossil fuels from third states and its ambition to reduce 
fossil-fuel related emissions. This is why it should not surprise that the EU has taken 
                                                                      
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented in Brussels at the Consent workshop on an integrated energy policy. 
The authors would like to thank Carlo Trojan for his useful comments on the paper. 
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a firm position in what is called the post-2012 climate negotiations and is willing to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 %, even when other industrialised countries 
would not take up a comparable commitment.  
 
Reaching an ambitious international agreement that will lead to deep emission cuts 
cannot be taken for granted. Although climate change certainly has become a more 
important issue for countries all over the world, and has featured prominently on 
the agenda of a large number of high-level international meetings, the EU remains 
the driving force behind the international climate change negotiations. But, even 
within the EU it is still an open question how the current financial crisis will affect 
the  political  support  for  climate  change  policies.  There  is  moreover  a  lot  of 
uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  position  the  new  US  government  will  take  in  the 
international climate negotiations, and to what extent other countries are willing to 
commit to the more steep reduction levels the EU is advocating.  
 
Most  importantly,  whether  the  EU  will  succeed  in  convincing  other  countries  to 
follow its course will depend to a large extent on its ability to demonstrate that it is 
possible  to  achieve  greenhouse  gas  emissions  domestically  without  compromising 
economic growth. It will also depend on its ability to play the role of ‘honest broker’ 
and create a coalition between the developed countries, in particular the United 
States, on the one hand and the developing countries, whose support has proven 
insurmountable in the pas, on the other hand. In that  respect it is  important to 
realise that the developing countries consider that more developed countries, such 
as  the  EU  Member  States,  should  offer  financial  means  for  climate  change 
adaptation and their transition to a low-carbon economy.  
 
Climate change, by definition, is a EU policy area where the internal and external 
dimensions are strongly interwoven. This is reinforced by other elements, such as 
the linkage between emission credits obtained by reducing inside the EU and those 
obtained from projects in developing countries, the innovation push EU policies can 
possibly have on a global scale, and the possible use of trade measures  vis-à-vis 
countries not willing to take up a carbon reduction commitment.  
 
This contribution will discuss the EU’s international climate change position and its 
relations  with  domestic  climate  change  policies.  The  main  focus  is  on  mitigation 
policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and not on adaptation policies that 
are needed to cope with the consequences of climate change. With regard to the 
mitigation policies the focus is on policy instruments used such as the EU emissions 
trading  scheme.  However,  it  is  realised  that  a  much  broader  set  of  government 
policies, as well as other factors such as the price of oil, influences whether the 
European Union, and other parts of the world, will quickly and cheaply make the 
transition to a low carbon economy.  
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
The EU is often portrayed as the saviour of the Kyoto Protocol. After the withdrawal 
of the United States in 2001 the EU stood united and convinced Japan, Canada and 
Russia to continue with ratification. This was needed to ensure that the threshold 
for entry into force would be reached. Due to this successful diplomatic endeavour, 
the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005
2. The EU’s  historic activism in the 
climate change negotiations can be understood by a number of factors.  
 
First of all, European politicians, or at least a considerable number among them, 
appear to be truly concerned about the threats to human kind posed by climate 
change.  They  are  firm  believers  of  the  scientific  evidence  presented  by  climate 
scientists gathered within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
EU citizens also consistently rank climate change among the issues of high concern 
to them
3. The attention given to Al Gore’s movie “An inconvenient truth”, the Stern 
report  on  the  economic  impacts  of  climate  change,  and  the  fourth  assessment 
report  of  the  IPCC  all  contributed  to  a  growing  concern  among  European 
populations.  
 
Secondly, the Kyoto Protocol embodies almost all the European Union believes in, 
most importantly that it is possible to address a problem of the commons by means 
of inter-state cooperation. The EU’s international climate agenda links in with the 
EU’s  ambition  for  effective  multilateralism  and  sustainable  development.  At  the 
same  time,  backing  so  strongly  the  Kyoto  Protocol  proved  an  opportunity  to 
demonstrate  Europe’s  preference  for  a  different  course,  than  the  unilateral  one 
advocated  by  the  Bush  government  of  the  US.  Moreover,  international  climate 
change policy proved an issue where the EU managed to stand united. Together with 
the EU support for the International Criminal Court it has often been mentioned to 
demonstrate that the EU can act with a single voice in international foreign policy 
issues, in contrast to its divides over the Iraq war and more recently the separation 
of Kosovo.
4  
 
Thirdly, climate change increasingly has been used as a vehicle to address energy 
security concerns. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a large extent is intimately 
linked to reducing the use of (imported) fossil fuels. The European Union is, and 
increasingly will be, an importer of fossil fuels. These for the larger part stem from 
countries  it  not  always  feels  comfortable  with.  When  Putin’s  Russia  closed  gas 
pipelines to neighbouring countries in 2006, many feared Russia would increasingly 
use energy as a political weapon. The EU’s security of supply position by then had
                                                                      
2 Cf. Oberthür, S. and C. Roche Kelly (2008), EU leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and 
Challenges, in: The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3., September, pp. 35-50.  
3 Special Eurobarometer 300, Europeans’ attitudes towards climate change, September 2008.   
4 M.L.P. Groenleer and L.G. van Schaik, United We Stand?, The European Union’s International Actorness in the 
Case of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, 
45(5), pp. 969-998.                     
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already become a key issue. Rising oil prices fuelled the already existing fear that 
the end of oil and gas reservoirs is near. As a consequence, while EU Member States 
have always been reluctant to hand over policy-making authority over the choice of 
energy sources, it makes absolute sense to them to improve their dependency on 
imported  fossil  fuels  by  increasing  energy  efficiency  and  shifting  to  renewable 
energy.  
  
Fourthly, climate change became in a way a saviour issue for the EU itself. In 2005 
the EU was almost in a desperate need for an appealing subject through which it 
could justify its added value to European citizens. The European integration project 
had come under serious pressure, most pronounced by the two negative votes on the 
European Constitution in EU founding states France and the Netherlands. Politically, 
it became almost impossible to continue discussions on institutional reform. Instead, 
it was considered more appropriate to focus on concrete projects where “Brussels” 
could show it ability to solve pressing cross-border policy problems, such as climate 
change. Still today, with the uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty, climate policy 
remains at the heart of the European project. 
 
The  above-mentioned  reasons  do  not  only  explain  why  the  EU  can  act  as  an 
international  leader  on  climate  change  issues,  but  also  why  it  can  put  forward 
ambitious climate change policies within the EU. It is important to realise though 
that some of the factors are rather unique to the EU, and that although climate 
change has gained in importance in other parts of the world, it nowhere is politically 
as important as it is in the EU. The international climate change agenda is largely a 
European agenda. This is perhaps most obviously demonstrated by the fact that the 
Secretariat of the UNFCCC is hosted in Bonn, Germany, and that two forthcoming UN 
Summits will be hosted in EU Member States: in Poznan, Poland, in December 2008 
and in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009.  
 
 
 
3. THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
The EU clearly was a driving force at the most recent UN Climate Summit in Bali in 
December  2007.  After  intense  and  chaotic  negotiations,  the  EU  delegation, 
supported by other delegations, successfully managed to get the US aboard of the 
so-called Bali Action Plan. This plan provides a roadmap for the negotiations on a 
post-2012  international  climate  change  agreement.  The  launch  of  the  post-2012 
negotiations and the setting of a deadline for their conclusion at the UN Summit in 
Copenhagen  in  2009  was  in  line  with  the  objectives  set  itself  at  the  European 
Council meeting in March 2007. In this meeting the EU not only agreed upon the 
famous triple 20 goals regarding emission reductions, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency
5,  but  also  outlined  a  list  of  elements  to  which  a  future  international 
agreement on climate change should adhere
6: 
                                                                      
5 The EU The Spring European Council of March 2007 was crucial, as it set ambitious EU goals to tackle climate 
change and to achieve secure, sustainable and competitive energy.  European Heads of State and Government set 
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- The development of a shared vision to reach the ultimate objective of the UN 
   Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
- The strengthening and extension of global carbon markets 
 
- The development, deployment and transfer of the necessary technology to     
   reduce emissions 
 
- Appropriate adaptation measures to deal with the effects of climate change 
  
- Action on deforestation  
 
- Addressing emissions from international aviation and maritime transportation 
 
This position is reiterated and specified in further detail in  a number of Council 
Conclusions drawn up in the Environment Council
7 and in specific EU submissions for 
the  negotiations  which  are  ongoing  within  the  context  of  the  United  Nations 
Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC).  These  consist  of  the 
forthcoming  UN  Summits  in  Poznán  and  Copenhagen  and  a  number  of  smaller 
meetings, such as the climate talks that were organised in 2008 in Bangkok, Bonn 
and Accra.  
 
 
3.1. A shared vision 
 
The EU has a long-term vision that the earth’s global surface temperature should 
not rise more than 2 degrees Celsius in comparison to pre-industrial levels. The 2 
degrees target would present a tipping point. When the temperature rise would be 
higher this would create irreversible damage and set in motion further deteriorating 
processes. To a certain extent the 2 degrees target is set in an arbitrary way (i.e. 
why not 1.8 or 2.2 degrees?), and is thereby a political choice and objective of the 
EU. It is not subscribed to by most other countries.  
 
The  importance  of  setting  a  shared  vision  in  terms  of  a  maximum  increase  in 
temperature  rise  at  global  level  is  that  such  a  level  corresponds  with 
emissionscenarios in the IPCC’s forecasting. For the EU it is important to achieve 
reduction  efforts  that  are  commensurate  with  the  scientific  finding  of  the  IPCC. 
Agreeing  upon  a  maximum  temperature  increase,  in  combination  with 
acknowledging  the  scientific  findings  of  the  IPCC,  implies  taking  a  scientific 
approach  to  deciding  on  reduction  targets.  This  may  avoid  horse  trading  over
                                                                                                                                                                         
three key targets:  a reduction in the EU’s overall level of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20 % below 1990 
levels by 2020 – rising to 30 % in case of a future international climate agreement; a 20 % share in the EU final 
energy consumption by 2020 and an energy efficiency improvement of 20 %.  
6 European Council (2007), Presidency Conclusions, 8/9 March. 
7 The most ones are the following: Council Conclusions on the preparations for the 14
th session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP 14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 4
th 
session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 4) (Poznán, 1-12 December 2008), 2898
th 
Environment Council meeting, Luxembourg, 20 October.  
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the  overall  emission  reduction  objective.  In  the  Bali  Action  Plan  countries  have 
recognised  the  need  for  deeper  cuts  in  global  emissions  and  to  address  climate 
change  as  indicated  in  the  Fourth  Assessment  Report  of  the  IPCC.  A  footnote 
reference was made to the IPCC work in which the reduction numbers are given.    
 
Another consequence of setting the 2 degrees target is that it provides scientific 
information for what the EU should do itself in terms of emissions reductions. The 
IPCC  has  translated  the  2  degrees  target  as  meaning  a  25-40  %  reduction  for 
developed  countries  in  2020  and  a  80-95  %  reduction  by  2050.  The  EU  calls  for 
developed  countries  to  commit  to  collectively  reducing  their  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases in the order of 30 % by 2020 compared to 1990. They should do so 
with a view to collectively reducing emissions by 60 % to 80 % by 2050 compared to 
1990.
8 For the economically fast-growing developing countries it has called for a 15 
% reduction in 2020 in comparison to business as usual projections.
9 The EU is willing 
to  reduce  its  own  emissions  by  30  %  in  2020  “provided  that  other  developed 
countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically 
more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”.
10 When others will not do this, the EU 
has indicated that it will still reduce its own emissions by 20 %.  
 
 
3.2. Targets and trading 
 
In  terms  of  commitment  the  EU  argues  for  “absolute  emission  reduction 
commitments  as  these  are  the  backbone  of  a  global  carbon  market”.
11  When 
choosing for emissions trading it makes sense to argue a target is needed. Without 
having a firm cap it is difficult to make the price estimates needed in order to trade 
emissions, which may reduce incentives to innovate into low carbon technologies. It 
could lead to a continuing pressure to relax the cap. It will also make it difficult to 
link domestic emission trading schemes, such as the ETS, to other schemes. The EU 
is furthermore keen on agreeing on legally binding reduction targets since it believes 
this  to  be  the  only  way  to  really  ensure  that  reductions  will  occur.  The  EU’s 
preference for a “targets and trading” approach may however obstruct progress in 
the negotiations as important negotiating partners, such as China, India and Japan, 
and  others  have  stated  openly  their  opposition  to  legally  binding  absolute 
greenhouse gas reduction targets.
12 Even the US Obama government is unlikely to be 
enthusiastic about committing to legally-binding targets at the international level, 
                                                                      
8 Presidency Conclusions March 2007. 
9 Council Conclusions, October 2008. 
10 Presidency Conclusions March 2007. 
11 Presidency Conclusions March 2007. 
12 Höhne, N., Meira Filho, G., Marcovitch, J., Yamin, F. and S. Moltmann, History and status of the international 
climate change negotiations on a future climate agreement, Basis workshop future international climate policy, 
2006.  
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particularly when it would be a much more stringent than a target set in a domestic 
cap-and-trade system.
13 Copenhagen in this respect may come too early.
14  
 
Alternative  approaches  may  be  sectoral  targets,  a  commitment  with  regard  to 
policies  and  measures  (the  “pledge  and  review”  approach),  and  softer  ways  of 
setting targets. These are for instance “no lose targets”, which state a maximum 
level  of  emissions  under  which  developing  countries  need  to  stay  in  order  to  be 
eligible  to  participate  in  the  carbon  market,  and  the  use  of  “a  safety  valve”,  a 
maximum  price  on  allowances.
15  The  EU  seems  not  very  much  convinced  of  the 
merits  of  such  approaches  as  they  do  not  guarantee  reductions  in  quantitative 
terms. But, in order to reach a deal it may have to accept such alternatives to the 
targets and trading approach. An approach to which it is more favourable are the 
sectoral targets that could be agreed upon for certain industry sectors, which are 
active in only a limited number of countries, and truly operate and compete on the 
international  plane  (e.g.  the  steel  sector).  Developing  countries  are  less 
enthusiastic. They accuse the EU and other industrialised states for using sectoral 
targets as a means to impose reduction targets upon them.  
 
A meaningful participation by developing countries is however not only dependent 
upon the type of commitments. It is hampered most of all by their declared position 
that US participation is a conditio sine qua non. Developing countries are unlikely to 
accept binding commitments until and unless the US also does so. The US on the 
other hand, at least in the past, has always declared a meaningful participation by 
the  emerging  economies  to  be  essential  in  order  to  agree  upon  a  credible  and 
effective future climate agreement. The challenge for the EU is hence to both get 
the  US  and  the  developing  countries  on  board,  making  it  more  difficult  also  to 
impose  the  instrument  through  which  emissions  in  these  countries  should  be 
reduced.  
 
 
3.3. Finance for adaptation and technology transfer 
 
Even if the US would take up commitments it is still uncertain whether the emerging 
economies will take up meaningful greenhouse gas emissions reductions in a post-
2012 agreement. An important principle in the climate negotiations is the adherence 
to  “common,  but  differentiated  responsibility”,  meaning  that  those  responsible 
(historically) for the largest share of emissions should be the first to reduce them. 
Developing countries argue that their per capita emissions are still just a fraction of
                                                                      
13 Smith, J. and D. Mix (2007), Transatlantic Climate Chang Challenge, in: The Washington Quaterly, 31:1, 
Winter 2007-2008.  
14 Diringer, E. (2008), The US Election and Prospects for a New Climate Agreement, Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, contribution to the Transatlantic Climate Policy Group.  
15 Bodansky, D. (2004), International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches, Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA (http://www.pewclimate.org ).                    
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these of the OECD countries and that they still have a long way to go in terms of 
economic development. On the other hand, it seems more effective and efficient to 
decouple greenhouse gas emission rise from economic growth in countries where the 
energy  infrastructure  is  still  in  its  infancy.  Technological  innovations  in  such 
circumstances require other investment patterns and considerable emission cuts will 
only  occur  when  new  technologies  spread  rapidly.  The  question  is  thus  which 
measures  would  provide  the  right  incentives  to  trigger  such  processes  without 
damaging economic growth.  
 
Another important question is to what extent the OECD countries would need to 
contribute to funding of adaptation activities in developing countries. Within the 
context  of  the  international  climate  change  negotiations,  the  importance  of 
assisting developing countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and to 
provide funds for technology transfer and other means to bring down greenhouse gas 
emissions,  has  been  acknowledged.
16  It  seems  logical  that  acknowledging  a 
responsibility for the climate change problem implies a willingness to pay for its 
consequences, but it is not as simple as that. The costs incurred by climate change 
in  developing  countries  may  by  far  exceed  the  annual  amount  of  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) the EU is providing.
17 In total about $100-200 billion 
is  expected  to  be  needed  per  year  to  invest  in  clean  energy,  improved  energy 
access,  and  making  development  less  vulnerable  to  climate  change.
18  Currently 
available  funds,  such  as  those  of  the  Adaptation  Fund  are  of  a  much  smaller 
magnitude ($80-300 million per year in the period 2008-2012). Developing countries 
argue  that  the  resources  should  not  be  coming  from  development  aid  that  was 
already earmarked to them.
19  
 
For the EU and other OECD countries it is however difficult to argue domestically 
why the EU and other countries would have to “pay for building levies” in the more 
advanced developing countries, where economic growth figures by far exceed that 
of  their  own  country.  The  small  sums  that  thus  far  have  been  offered  give  the 
impression  that  they  are  just  used  to  “buy  support  from  the  South”  for  the 
international climate regime as such.
20 Recent initiatives such as the Global Climate 
Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most 
vulnerable to climate change look promising, but their current funding is not very 
impressive  either.  In  the  light  of  the  current  economic  crisis  it  is  moreover 
unrealistic to expect new budget lines for climate change activities in developing 
                                                                      
16   The Bali Action Plan (2007) calls for  “adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources”.
  
17 Klein, R.J.T. and A. Persson (2008), Financing Adaptation to Climate Change: Issues and Priorities, European 
Climate Platform Report No. 8,  October.  
18 UNFCCC (2007), Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, United Nations Framework 
Convention  on  Climate  Change  Secretariat,  Bonn;  Kok  et  al.  (2008),  Integrating  development  and  climate 
policies: national and international benefits, in: Climate Policy, vol 8, no. 2, pp. 103-118.  
19 Kartha, S., Bhandari, P., Van Schaik, L., Cornland, D. and B. Kjellén (2006), Adaptation as a Strategic Issue in 
the Climate Negotiations, Report by the European Climate Platform.  
20 idem  
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countries to become in place, in addition to already committed ODA funds. For EU 
Member States it already presents a challenge to meet their ODA commitment.
21  
 
 
3.4. Other issues 
  
Other  issues  include  how  to  treat  forestry,  and  how  to  include  emissions  from 
international aviation and maritime in an international climate regime. On forestry 
the EU is willing to be more ambitious than the Kyoto regime currently allows, but it 
wants to avoid developing countries to be eligible to sell large amounts of “emission 
reduction” credits, just because they avoid deforestation to occur. Instead, the EU 
suggests to finance activities to combat deforestation, but whether it will really be 
able to offer sufficient funds to that regard remains to be seen.  
 
Including  emissions  from  aviation  and  maritime  in  the  international  post-Kyoto 
regime is extremely important for the EU, but it has encountered great difficulties 
to  obtain  any  support  for  this  within  the  relevant  international  organisations  for 
international aviation and maritime questions, the ICAO and IMO. It tries to include 
the sectors within the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, but thus far it has not 
been successful.  
 
 
 
4. EU CLIMATE DIPLOMACY 
 
 
The EU’s performance in the international climate change negotiations will depend 
to a large extent on its domestic performance as will be discussed below. It will also 
be influenced by it ability to stay united vis-à-vis its negotiating partners. Its ability 
to be convincing to others hinges upon its ability to speak with a single voice, to be 
coherent, strategic and skilful in international negotiations. This is related to how 
the EU organises itself. 
  
Whereas policies to achieve greenhouse gas reduction are generally decided upon 
through the normal Community method, the decision-making on the mandate for the 
international  climate  change  negotiations  is  more  intergovernmental.  There  is  a 
more substantial role for the Council and a smaller role for the European Parliament 
and European Commission.  
 
The  EU  position,  which  de  facto  could  be  considered  a  negotiating  mandate,  is 
written  down  in  Council  Conclusions  and  more  recently  in  the  Presidency 
Conclusions (European Council), as well as in EU submissions and statements. The 
position is usually drafted by the Presidency of the EU Council, which is held by one 
of the EU Member States on a six-monthly rotating basis. At the UN Climate Summit 
in Copenhagen, Sweden will be the EU Presidency.  The EU position is decided upon
                                                                      
21  Cf.  Van  Schaik,  L.G.  and  N.  Maes  (2008),  Bilateral  and  EU  Development  Cooperation: 
Delivering More and Better Aid, Clingendael Seminar Overview paper.                     
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 in the Council. This usually happens by consensus reflecting the  Member States’ 
individual  competence  to  negotiate  in  international  bodies  and  to  conclude 
international  agreements  on  environmental  issues.
22  It  has  been  argued  that  the 
position could also be adopted by means of qualified majority voting. In any event, 
the final version of an international climate change agreement would need to be 
signed and ratified by both the European Community and all the Member States.  
 
Within  the  EU  Council,  climate  change  is  the  prerogative  of  the  Environment 
Ministers,  but  the  issue  is  also  being  discussed  within  the  European  Council. 
Preparatory  work  is  done  mainly  by  the  Council  Working  Party  on  International 
Environmental Issues (WPIEI, Climate Change formation). The WP IEI is composed 
mainly of senior officials from Environment Ministries and DG Environment.  
 
During  the  international  climate  change  negotiations,  there  are  (Environment) 
Council  meetings  on  location,  the  so-called  ‘EU  coordination’  meetings.  In  these 
meetings, which take place on a daily basis, the climate delegations of the Member 
States  and  the  European  Commission  meet  at  senior  official  or  ministerial  level. 
They  decide  how  to  adjust  the  EU  position  to  reach agreement  with  negotiating 
partners. EU coordination takes a considerable amount of time, but generally helps 
the  EU  to  firmly  unite  around  an  issue.  The  internal  discussions  also  tend  to 
strengthen the EU’s argumentative capacity. The Presidency of the EU Council is 
officially  in  charge  of  EU  coordination  and  the  external  representation.  Its 
representative speaks on behalf of the EC and the EU Member States and is in its 
tasks assisted by the subsequent, or incoming Presidency, the European Commission 
and the Council Secretariat. In combination this group is referred to as the troika.  
 
Because  the  formal  workload  for  the  Council  Presidency  has  at  times  been 
overwhelming, and because it was deemed important to ensure continuity in the 
negotiations, other Member States in the past have assisted or taken over parts of 
the  external  representation.  Since  2004  a  more  formalised  system  is  in  place  in 
which the EU appoints “issue leaders” and “lead negotiators”.
23 These are senior 
officials from Member States and the Commission who cover a specific issue for a 
longer term. Under the auspices of the Presidency they take care of most of the 
negotiations at the working level. There is for instance a lead negotiator for the 
mitigation and one for the adaptation agenda.  
 
The EU’s strategy stretches beyond the negotiations conducted within the context of 
the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC).  Due  to 
strong support by the European Commission and several EU Member States, climate 
change has been included in a wide range of bilateral meetings and featured on the 
                                                                      
22 The legal basis is Art. 174:4 of the Environment chapter of the EC Treaty. It refers to Art. 300 (EC Treaty), 
which states that with regard to Community policies it is the Commission that will be authorised by the Council to 
negotiate international agreements with third countries. The last sentence of Art. 174:4 stipulates however that 
“the previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ competence to negotiate in international 
bodies and to conclude international agreements”.  
23 Cf. Oberthür, S. and C. Roche Kelly (2008), EU leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and 
Challenges, in: The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3., September, pp. 35-50.    
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agenda of several international organisation (e.g. World Bank, UN General Assembly, 
UN Security Council, UN Development Programme, G-8, World Health Organisation, 
etc). Climate change and (renewable) energy have become more important topics 
within the EU’s development cooperation activities, European Neighbourhood Policy 
and Bilateral Agreements. Thereby, climate change increasingly is included in the 
overall framework of EU external relations, where it is almost as important as trade 
and security relations. This  is reinforced and stimulated by the Green Diplomacy 
network  that  consists  of  diplomats  working  at  the  foreign  ministries  of  Member 
States.  Although  other  external  policies  thus  far  have  been  remarkably  coherent 
with the EU’s climate agenda, this should not be taken for granted. It clearly is the 
result  of  the  strong  backing  climate  change  has  received  at  the  highest  political 
levels. In fact, the strongly segmented decision-making structures in the Council, is 
no  good  recipe  for  coherence.
24  Clashes  of  interests  between  the  EU’s  trade, 
development cooperation, agriculture, foreign politics and climate change agenda 
have already occurred in the past and can be expected to reoccur in the future.   
 
That  the  relationship  with  foreign  policy  has  become  more  important  is  also 
demonstrated  by  the  increased  attention  devoted  to  the  relationship  between 
climate change and security. The 2008 Solana paper on the issue is the best proof of 
this.
25 It followed inter alia a study by former US generals.
26 By the end of 2008 
Solana is expected to come with a more specific follow-up paper.  
 
Hence,  climate  change  has  increasingly  entered  the  realm  of  high  politics  and 
transcended from being merely an environmental issue into an important EU foreign 
policy issue. In the international negotiations for the time being the Environment 
Minister of the country holding the rotating Presidency is still in the lead, but it 
remains to be seen whether this will continue to be the case in the future. With 
more climate policies being adopted internally in the EU, the Commission may claim 
authority over external representation in line with earlier rulings of the European 
Court of Justice on the parallelism of internal and external EC competence.
27 It is 
furthermore an interesting question whether the EU foreign policy coordinator that 
is foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty and his or her External Action Service would seek an 
interest in taking over external representation. This would depend on the extent to 
which  the  EU’s  position  in  the  climate  negotiations  is  termed  foreign  politics  or 
environmental policy-making. If the Lisbon treaty would enter into force, also the 
European  Parliament  may  become  more  involved.  It  current  advisory  role  would 
change to that of giving assent to any international agreement decided upon. It may 
use this veto position to demand a more prominent role vis-à-vis the content of the
                                                                      
24 Cf. CEPS (2006), Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council, paperback.  
25 Climate change and international security, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission 
to the European Council, 14 March 2008, S113/08.  
26 US generals paper on climate and security. National security and the threat of climate change (2007), CNA 
Corporation. 
27 Cf. F. Hoffmeister, Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on 
the  Status  of  the  European  Union  in  International  Organizations  and  Treaty  Bodies,  Common  Market  Law 
Review, 2007, 44: 41-68.                     
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EU’s  negotiating  position  and  may  demand  more  information  on  how  the  EU 
conducts its external representation.  
 
Persisting EU unity and leadership in the climate negotiations is not automatic. It 
remains  a  challenge  to  reach  consensus  among  the  27  Member  States  and 
particularly  the  new  Member  States  would  be  less  ambitious.
28  The  EU’s 
performance  is  moreover  still  to  a  large  extent  dependent  upon  the  rotating 
Presidency. There are some doubts with regard to whether the EU, and particularly 
the  delegates  from  Environment  Ministries,  will  be  flexible  enough  to  adjust  to 
design choices preferred by the US and developing countries, and are not too much 
attached to the Kyoto Protocol framework.   
 
Regardless of how the EU’s external machinery will operate, an important question 
will  remain  how  the  EU’s  domestic  policies  will  evolve.  The  EU’s  international 
position is critically dependent upon its internal ability to reduce emissions at low 
cost. Its ability to lead by example is related to what it has achieved thus far and 
probably even more by its ability to adopt successfully the recently adopted climate 
action and renewable energy package.  
 
 
 
5. THE EU’S CARBON MARKET AND ITS INTERNATIONAL LINKS 
 
 
Mainly due to a switch from coal to gas in the UK and a restructuring of the economy 
in former Eastern Germany, the EU-15 thus far did manage to lower its emissions in 
comparison to 1990 levels, but it is not yet sure whether the effects of the current 
policies will be sufficient to reach the –8 % reduction target which has been pledged 
by 2008-2012.
29 Member States may have to accelerate their own policy efforts, as 
well as consider to expand buying emission reduction credits at the international 
carbon market. The Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007 are also likely to 
meet  their  emission  reduction  targets,  since  they  are  still  recovering  from  a 
restructuring of their economic activities in the early 1990 which led to a rather 
drastic reduction of their emissions. It is not yet clear how the economic downturn 
that is expected for the coming years could affect emissions. What is clear is that 
current policies will not be enough to achieve the much larger cuts the EU is aiming 
for in 2020, and hence that new policies both at the European and national level will 
have  to  be  adopted  (some  Member  States,  such  as  the  UK,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands, have already adopted ambitious national reduction objectives).    
 
Domestic EU climate measures are clearly connected to the international climate 
change regime. This section will focus on the EU’s most important policy instrument 
for  reducing  emissions,  the  emission  trading  scheme,  and  briefly  the  contentious 
                                                                      
28 Oberthür, S. and C. Roche Kelly (2008), EU leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and 
Challenges, in: The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3., September, pp. 35-50. 
29 European Environment Agency (2008), Greenhouse gas emission trends and projections in Europe 2008, EEA 
Report No 5/2008.  
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issue  of  including  aviation  into  this  scheme.  The  focus  is  on  the  international 
implications of the scheme. It is realised that there are also many other policies 
that affect emissions such as the energy performance of buildings directive, land 
use, renewable energy and energy efficiency policies.
30  
 
 
5.1. The EU Emission Trading Scheme 
 
Since 2005 the Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is up and running in the European 
Union. The scheme is designed to help Member States achieve their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reduction commitments
31 in a cost-effective way. It is the largest in the world 
and  covers  more  than  12  000  industrial  sites  in  the  27  Member  States  that  are 
responsible for almost half of carbon dioxide emissions in the EU. The first trading 
phase covered the period 2005 – 2007 whilst the second trading phase has begun on 
1 January 2008 and will run until the end of 2012 (it thereby coincides with the 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol).  
 
The origins of the EU ETS demonstrate the strong link between the EU's domestic 
climate policy and the international regime. During the negotiations of the Protocol, 
European countries reacted reluctantly towards the concept of trading greenhouse 
gas emissions. Unlike the United States, most European countries did not have any 
experience with any cap and trade regime. In order to prepare the Member States 
for international emissions trading by 2008, as foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol, the 
European Commission wanted to gain practical experience with emissions trading.
32 
More importantly was that it proved politically not possible to agree upon a carbon 
tax to reduce emissions. A reason was that fiscal measures have to be adopted by 
unanimity. The emissions trading scheme could be adopted through the co-decision 
procedure with qualified decision-making as decision-making rule in the Council. It 
was also the most favoured policy instrument for regulating carbon emissions by the 
private sector. As a result, a Community-wide emissions trading scheme covering 
European companies could be agreed upon within the EU in 2003 and entered into 
force in 2005.  
 
The EU ETS gradually developed into a mature system. It became operational before 
the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and functions independently of it. Today, 
it constitutes the flagship of the EU's climate policy. Moreover, there is some sort of 
boomerang  effect  in  the  sense  that  experiences  with  the  EU  ETS  have  external 
effects. Indeed, the EU ETS serves as a model for other emission trading schemes in
                                                                      
30  Cf.  a  good  overview  of  existing  policies:  Oberthür,  S.  and  C.  Roche  Kelly  (2008),  EU  leadership  in 
International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges, in: The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3., 
September,  pp.  35-50;  or  the  European  Commission’s  document  Progress  Towards  Achieving  the  Kyoto 
Objectives.  
31 The respective commitments of the countries Member States are determined as follows. The so-called burden-
sharing agreement redistributes the EU's Kyoto target of 8% among the 15 old Member States. Of the new EU 
countries, most are subject to individual -8% Kyoto targets, except Poland and Hungary which both have a Kyoto 
target of -6% and Malta and Cyprus which do not have any Kyoto target. 
32 European Commission, Green Paper on greenhouse gas trading, 2000.                    
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the world and as the nucleus for a potential international carbon market under the 
post 2012 international climate regime. In other words, the EU ETS has developed 
from the mere domestic EU application of one of Kyoto's flexible mechanisms to a 
self-standing climate policy instrument which provides a dress rehearsal for a global 
system.  
 
 
5.2. The link with the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms 
 
The ETS is not only historically linked with the international climate regime, there is 
also  an  important  regulatory  link  between  the  scheme  and  the  project-based 
flexible  mechanisms  (Clean  Development  Mechanism  and  Joint  Implementation) 
under  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  Thanks  to  the  so-called  Linking  Directive
33,  companies 
covered  by  the  ETS  have  to  a  certain  extent
34  the  possibility  to  use  credits 
generated by emission-saving projects carried out in third countries under the CDM 
and JI to cover their emissions. This way, domestic EU reduction targets are directly 
coupled to support for climate change activities in developing countries.  
 
The  linkage  implies  that  private  actors  in  the  EU  directly  participate  in  the 
international  climate  regime.  More  importantly,  European  companies  not  merely 
participate in this regime, they are largely responsible for its development. Figures 
show that in 2007 EU companies were the most active buyers on the CDM and JI 
market, with 79% of  volume transacted.
35 The prospect that European companies 
may use up to 1 392 million CDM and JI credits in the second ETS phase (2008-2012) 
- which  represents more than half of the potential global demand for these credits - 
has  been  a  major  driver  for  the  explosive  growth  of  CDM  projects  in  developing 
countries (mainly India and China). 
 
However, the strong link between emissions trading in the EU ETS and the flexible 
mechanisms is quite ambiguous. There are several doubts about the environmental 
integrity and the efficiency of the CDM.
36 Many CDM projects have failed to generate 
additional  GHG  reductions  in  developing  countries  which  implies  that,  instead  of 
reducing emissions at home, European companies are financing emission-reduction 
projects that would have been carried out anyway, because they reduce costs of 
                                                                      
33 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004, amending Directive 
2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the Community, in 
respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, OJ, L 338, 13 November 2004, p. 18. 
34 The use of CDM and JI credits by EU companies is limited, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Each Member 
State must specify in its national allocation plan (NAP) the maximum extent to which companies on its territory 
may use JI  or CDM credits. This limit is expressed as a percentage of the allocation of allowances to each 
installation. As far as the qualitative limitation is concerned, the link between ETS and the flexible mechanisms 
does not allow for the conversion of credits from nuclear facilities or from land-use, land use change and forestry 
activities (“sinks”). 
35 State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008 
36 See M. W. Wara and D. G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Off sets, PESD Working Paper, 
No. 74, April 2008; L. Schneider, Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental and sustainable objectives?  
An evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement, Report prepared for WWF, Öko-Institut, 5 November 
2007.  
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production.  There  are  furthermore  complaints  about  CDM  activities  being 
concentrated in China and other emerging economies. Too few projects would be 
established  in  the  least  developed  countries.  On  a more  strategic  level  the  CDM 
poses  the  question  of  how  emissions  reductions  from  CDM  projects  compare  to 
reductions  following  from  government  policies.  Could  domestic  policies  interfere 
with opportunities for CDM project and could in this respect the CDM constitute a 
barrier  for new policies to be put  in place? Yet others  argue the CDM should be 
scaled up to such an extent that it goes beyond projects and could in the future lead 
to  sector-based  activities  financed  by  richer  countries  through  which  developing 
countries can reduce their emissions. In this context, some observers have argued 
for a fundamental reform of the CDM and possibly to decouple the ETS from the 
CDM.
37  
 
 
5.3. The prototype for an international carbon market 
 
The  ETS  has  become  a  landmark  in  international  climate  change  policy.  It  has 
become the reference for a much larger international emissions trading scheme. As 
mentioned above, the scheme serves as a model for other emission trading schemes 
in the world. Article 25 of the ETS Directive indeed provides the possibility of linking 
the ETS with other (national or regional) greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. 
 
A number of countries are developing or are considering domestic emission trading 
schemes. Schemes are emerging  in the US, Australia  and Canada (albeit at state 
level),  and  various  developing  countries  have  expressed  interest  in  the  use  of 
emissions trading. This could lead to the emergence of a truly international carbon 
market.  Such  an  international  market,  connecting  the  various  schemes  to  each 
other,  is  one  of  the  key  issues  in  the  negotiations  on  a  post-2012  international 
climate  change  regime.  The  ETS,  the  largest  and  most  important  scheme  at  the 
moment, could constitute the central pillar of this international carbon market.  
 
In November 2006, the European Commission issued a Communication highlighting 
the Commission’s commitment to the development of a global carbon market, as an 
instrument for tackling climate change. As mentioned above, in October 2007, the 
European Council stressed that a global carbon market is fundamental to encourage 
low-carbon  investments  and  underlined  the  importance  of  linking  the  emission 
trading schemes. 
 
In this context, the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) was set up  in 
2007.  ICAP  is  a  partnership  between  the  European  Commission,  a  number  of  EU 
Member States, US States, Canadian provinces, New Zealand and Norway. It intends 
to become a forum in which governments and public authorities that are engaged in
                                                                      
37 See J. Henningsen, EU energy and climate policy - two years on, EPC Issue Paper no. 55, September 2008, pp. 
16-18.                    
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the process of designing or implementing carbon markets can share experiences and 
discuss  relevant  questions  on  the  design,  compatibility  and  potential  linkage  of 
carbon markets. This way, ICAP should contribute to the establishment of a well-
functioning global carbon market.  
 
There are various options to link the EU ETS with other schemes. It could happen in 
a direct way, in the sense that entities are allowed to purchase and use allowances 
from  another  trading  scheme  for  domestic  compliance  obligations,  or  indirectly, 
whereby schemes A and B are linked to the EU ETS but not to each other. As for the 
legal  form,  linking  could  be  established  through  a  binding  international  treaty  - 
which is the preferable method - or through bilateral agreements. The prospect of 
the ETS as the foundation of a global emission market naturally raises the question 
which role the EU,  and in particular, the European Commission, should play in a 
linked system. There are two possible scenarios: either the EU ETS forms some sort 
of hub from which kinks emanate to other schemes, or a network of schemes exist 
with links between various schemes. In the latter case the EU's primary role would 
be probably less clear and the UNFCCC could instead manage the system.  
 
In theory, linking the various schemes to each other makes sense from an economic 
and  environmental  point  of  view.  It  would  reduce  overall  compliance  costs  and 
reduce  the  market  volatility  of  prices.  In  practice,  however,  it  is  clear  that 
connecting the  schemes to each other will be a considerable legal and technical 
challenge,  with  the  biggest  risk  being  the  incompatibility  of  the  designs  of  the 
respective schemes. As previously mentioned it also remains difficult to see how the 
ETS  could  be  linked  with  systems  in  countries  who  do  not  want  to  commit  at 
international  level  to  a  legally  binding  emissions  reduction  target,  which  would 
logically set the longer-term cap for emission reductions. 
 
 
5.4. The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
 
The  impact  of  aviation  on  climate  change  is  increasing.  The  aviation  industry  is 
considered  the  fastest  growing  source  of  carbon  dioxide  emissions  in  Europe. 
Between  1990  and  2004,  emissions  in  Europe  rose  by a  staggering  87%.  By  2020, 
aviation is expected to contribute around one fifth to the EU’s climate impact.
38 In 
order to reverse this trend, the European Commission adopted in December 2006 a 
proposal to integrate aviation in the EU ETS. In June 2008 the European Parliament 
and the Council reached an agreement on the Commission’s proposal, endorsing its 
key elements. The Council gave formal approval to the directive in October 2008.
39 
 
Following  the  newly  adopted  rule  both  internal  EU  flights  (with  departure  and 
arrival inside the EU) and external flights (with departure or arrival outside the EU) 
                                                                      
38  “Inclusion  of  aviation  emissions  in  the  EU  Emissions  Trading  Scheme”,  Workshop  on  the  European 
Commission’s proposal to include aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 7 June 2007, p. 1. 
39 Council press release 14664/08, "Council gives green light for inclusion of aviation into the EU Emissions 
Trading System", available from    
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/103533.pdf  
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will be covered by the trading scheme. However, the proposal foresees that when a 
third  country  adopts  measures  to  address  the  climate  impact  of  aviation,  the 
Commission has the possibility to exclude flights arriving from that country from the 
scope of application of the scheme.  
 
The  imposition  of  the  ETS  on  non-EU  carriers  threatens  to  invoke  political 
repercussions.  All  non-EU  countries  that  are  members  of  the  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization  (ICAO),  the  UN  body  that  regulates  international  aviation, 
have  expressed their opposition to the proposal on legal
40 and policy grounds. In 
September 2007, the ICAO's General Assembly adopted a resolution that would make 
it compulsory for countries implementing market-based measures, such as emissions 
trading,  to  first  obtain  the  agreement  of  each  third  party  operating  in  their 
airspace. 
41  The EU, however, registered a  formal reservation to the resolution, 
stating that it will not feel bound by it.
42 
 
Meanwhile, the United States described the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS as 
unlawful and unhelpful
43. Washington has even threatened that any unilateral moves 
forward by the EU may lead to retaliation with trade sanctions. In this respect, the 
already  troubled  transatlantic  relationship  in  terms  of  aviation  -  remember  the 
WTO-dispute  between  Boeing  and  Airbus  -  may  further  deteriorate.  More 
importantly, it risks jeopardising the ongoing negotiations on the second stage of 
the EU-US “Open Skies” Agreement.
44  
 
 
 
6. THE CLIMATE ACTION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY PACKAGE 
 
 
In March 2007, the European Council agreed on the ambitious 20-20-20 objectives. 
EU  heads  of  state  and  government  made  an  independent  commitment  to  reduce 
GHG  emissions  by  20  %  below  1990  levels  by  2020.  This  percentage  would  be 
automatically increased to a 30 % reduction in the case of an international climate 
change  agreement.  In  addition,  the  Council  agreed  to  increase  the  share  of
                                                                      
40 The question whether the EU has the competence under international law to include non-EU flights in the ETS 
is the subject of a debate in the literature. See M. Petersen, "The Legality of the EU's Stand-Alone Approach to 
the  Climate  Impact  of  Aviation:  The  Express  Role  Given  to  the  ICAO  by  the  Kyoto  Protocol",  Review  of 
European Community & International Environmental Law, Volume 17, Issue 2, August 2008, pp. 196 - 204. 
41  ICAO  resolution  A36-22,  Consolidated  statement  of  continuing  ICAO  policies  and  practices  related  to 
environmental protection, Appendix L, 28 September 2007. 
42 Written statement of reservation on behalf of the Member States of the European Community (EC) and the 
other states members of the European Civil Aviation (ECAC) [made at the 36th Assembly of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, 18-28 September 2007], MEMO/07/391, 2 October 2007. 
43 "Aviation Emissions Best Tackled Through Cooperation", Innovation, USINFO, 3 August 2007. 
44 The first EU-US Air Transport Agreement was signed on 30 April 2007. The agreement is essentially an "open 
skies" type of agreement, enabling European airlines to fly without restrictions from any point in the EU to any 
point in the US. The agreement also foresees closer cooperation between the US and the EU on environmental 
matters. Negotiations on a second-stage agreement, which could further liberalise mutual access to both markets, 
have commenced in May 2008.                    
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renewable energy in the EU final energy consumption to 20 % and to raise energy 
efficiency by 20 %.   
 
In  January  2008  the  European  Commission  presented  the  long-awaited  'climate 
action and renewable energy package’, a number of legislative proposals that, once 
approved, will form the first step towards implementation of the ambitious 20-20-20 
goals. The proposed package includes a revision of the emission trading scheme
45 
(EU ETS), a directive on renewable energy
46, a decision on effort sharing in the non-
ETS  sectors
47,  a  directive  on  carbon  capture  and  storage
48  as  well  as  revised 
environmental state aid guidelines
49. 
 
The  climate  package  is  closely  linked  to  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  on  an 
international climate change agreement for the post-2012 period. In line with the 
overall GHG reduction target, several key elements of the Commission proposals are 
made  dependent  on  whether  or  not  a  future  international  climate  agreement  is 
achieved. In addition, the package contains various design choices with relevance 
for the international climate change negotiations.  
 
 
6.1. A change of baseline year 
 
A  first  element  is  the  introduction  by  the  proposals  of  2005  as  the  baseline  for 
emission reductions. The choice for 2005 is justified, because it is the first year for 
which  reliable  data  were  available  from  the  sectors  covered  by  the  emissions 
trading scheme. A similar argument goes for the international negotiations, where 
the 1990 base year that was used for the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to persist, as 
there are no reliable 1990 data for many developing countries. But the choice for 
2005 may also be seen as a gesture towards the US, whose emissions have increased 
tremendously compared to 1990 levels and who may hence have a preference for 
using 2005 as a baseline.  
 
Within the EU the choice for 2005 as a baseline is contested by a number of new EU 
Member States who prefer earlier years when their emissions were still considerably 
lower. Their argument is opposed by a number of other Member States who consider 
the  package  as  proposed  by  the  Commission  is  balanced  and  provides  sufficient 
mechanisms  that  demonstrate  solidarity  with  less-wealthy  Member  States.  At  the 
time of writing it is unclear how this discussion will end. What is clear however is 
that the choice of baseline year is a sensitive and strategic issue, which will most 
                                                                      
45 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading system of the Community, COM(2008)16. 
46 Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, COM(2008)19  
47 Proposal for a Decision on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the 
Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, COM(2008)17. 
48  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  the  geological  storage  of  carbon  dioxide  and  amending  Council  Directives 
85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 
1013/2006, COM(2008)18 
49 Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection...  
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likely  also  be  the  case  in  the  international  negotiations.  Adjusting  the  baseline 
and/or target year in which emission reduction commitments have to be achieved is 
a method through which positions of states can be modified without the significance 
of this becoming clear to everyone immediately (e.g. it is not immediately clear 
how a minus 35% reduction in the period 2004-2034 compares to a –45% reduction in 
the period 1995-2035). Perhaps this is the  reason why the EU in its most recent 
Council Conclusions advocates the importance of a clear reference to 1990 as the 
base year in accordance with the findings of the IPCC.
50 
 
 
6.2. GDP per capita as distribution key 
 
A second element relates to the usage of relative GDP per capita as the criterion for 
differentiating reduction efforts between countries. Under the package, the sectors 
which  are  not  covered  by  the  ETS  (primarily  transport,  buildings,  services,  small 
industrial installations, agriculture and waste) have to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by 10% in comparison with 2005. This overall 10% target is divided among 
the  27  Member  States  on  the  basis  of  their  respective  GDP  per  capita  with  a 
boundary ranging from -20% to +20%. This should ensure that the reduction efforts 
and associated costs are distributed in a fair and equitable manner and allow for 
further economic growth in less wealthy Member States. In other words, it is the 
translation within the EU of the common but differentiated approach, one of the 
key principles of the international climate regime.   
 
The use of a GDP per capita index to differentiate between countries in the same 
manner as it is proposed between the EU Member States could be a strong trigger 
for  support  of  the  newly  industrialised  countries  for  the  future  international 
agreement.  It  would  provide  India  and  China,  who  are  traditionally  reluctant  to 
stringent  reduction  commitments,  with  quite  some  scope  for  emission  increases. 
Although  these  countries  strongly  increase  their  emissions,  their  per  capita 
emissions remain much lower than industrialised countries. Even on the basis of the 
present  trends,  the  per  capita  emissions  of  China  and  India  will  only  reach 
respectively two-thirds and one-fifth of those of the OECD countries in 2030. 
 
Some however argue against using GDP/ capita as a means to distribute emission 
reduction commitments. They argue it is more cost-effective to avoid emissions in 
countries where the energy infrastructure is not yet as much developed as in the 
OECD countries. Others wonder how we could possibly reach the reduction levels 
advocated by the IPCC scientific evidence when China and India do not reduce their 
absolute  emissions,  or  at  least  make  their  economic  growth  trajectory  less 
greenhouse gas intensive. 
                                                                      
50 Council Conclusions on the preparations for the 14
th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 4
th session of the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 4) (Poznán, 1-12 December 2008), 2898
th Environment Council meeting, 
Luxembourg, 20 October.                     
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This is the reason why countries, such as the US, Japan, Australia, Russia, Canada 
and  the  OPEC  countries,  cannot  be  expected  to  support  a  distribution  of  GHG 
emission reductions fully on the basis of GDP/capita levels. Also the EU itself wants 
advanced developing countries like China and India to “contribute adequately” to 
emission reductions, thereby implicitly rejecting the idea of distributing the burden 
in such a way that emissions could still increase in the poorer countries.  
Another options would be a division on the basis of GHG emissions per capita, but 
here similar issues as the ones outlined above come to the fore.  The EU however 
seems more keen on this solution. In its most recent Council Conclusions it argues 
“that,  by  2050,  global  average  greenhouse  gas  emissions  per  capita  should  be 
reduced to around two tonnes CO2 equivalent, and that in the long term, gradual 
convergence  of  national  per  capita  greenhouse  gas  emissions  between  developed 
and developing countries would be necessary”.
51 
 
 
6.3. Expanded use of project-based mechanisms in developing countries 
 
A third element in the package is the forecast of an increased use of CDM credits 
within  the  ETS  in  case  an  international  agreement  is  signed.  The  Commission's 
proposal to reform the ETS allows companies to continue the use CDM and JI credits 
after 2012 but the extent of this possibility explicitly depends upon the existence of 
a satisfactory international climate treaty. This is a clear signal to the developing 
countries that the EU is willing to offer a large potential for buying up a lot of CDM 
credits. It thus serves as a strong negotiation element for the EU in the current post-
Kyoto discussions.  
 
The proposal makes a distinction between various scenarios.  
 
•  In case no international agreement were reached, JI and CDM credits can be 
used in the third trading period up to the import limit of the second phase
52, 
but no new JI and CDM credits would be allowed. In other words, operators 
will be able to use credits given to them by their governments for the period 
2008-2012 that they have not already used up.  
 
•  However, if an international agreement would be reached, the limit on the 
use  of  JI/CDM  credits  would  be  automatically  increased  up  to  half  of  the 
additional reduction effort. This means that if the annual cap under the EU 
ETS were reduced by e.g. 200 million tonnes following a global agreement (in 
order to achieve the more stringent 30% reduction target), the limit on the 
use of JI/CDM credits would be raised automatically by 100 million credits. 
(monetary values) 
 
                                                                      
51 Council Conclusion October 2008.  
52 Under the conditions for the second trading period, around 1400 Mt of credits are allowed to enter the ETS, or a 
yearly average of 280 Mt.  
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•  Furthermore, in the event that the conclusion of an international agreement 
is delayed, credits from projects or other emission reducing activities may be 
used  in  the  Community  scheme  in  accordance  with  bilateral  agreements 
concluded with third countries, specifying levels of use. Moreover, only CDM 
credits from third countries which have ratified the new agreement will be 
accepted in the ETS.  
 
The European Commission’s proposal has already lead to uncertainty on the CDM and 
JI markets. According to the World Bank, the European Commission's proposal has 
"the  risk,  surely  unintended,  of  slowing  the  momentum  for  the  project-based 
mechanisms".  It  is  also  not  clear  how  it  squares  with  the  more  fundamental 
discussion on reform of the CDM. If is for instance not clear what will happen with 
the  availability  of  credits  when  projects  would  be  restricted  in  China,  India  and 
Brazil.  
 
 
6.4. Trade measures 
 
A  fourth  element  is  the  introduction  of  the  possibility  for  the  installation  of  a 
'carbon  equalisation  system'.  Should  the  post-Kyoto  negotiations  fail  to  lead  to  a 
deal, the Commission reserves itself the right to identify by June 2011 which energy 
intensive sectors are likely to be subject to carbon leakage, i.e. the relocation to 
third  countries  with  less  stringent  climate  change  policies.  Energy-intensive 
industries  which  are  found  to  be  exposed  to  a  significant  risk  of  carbon  leakage 
could not only receive up to 100% of their allowances for free, an effective carbon 
equalisation system could be introduced in order to neutralise the distorting effects 
from third-country imports. Such a system could for instance consist in applying a 
border tax adjustment to importers of the products concerned in the ETS.  
 
The possibility of a carbon equalisation system is not only an answer to the fears of 
European  industry  and  social  partners,  it  also  aims  at  deterring  (industrialised) 
countries that are reluctant to commit to GHG emission reduction commitments in 
an international regime. The Commission indeed leaves a substantial time gap for 
those countries to commit themselves after the 2009 Copenhagen conference.   
 
The potential establishment of a EU carbon tax adjustment mechanism - principally 
advocated by France - has brought the relationship between the EU climate change 
policy and international trade rules to the forefront. Although the Commission has 
explicitly stated that any action should be in conformity with these rules, there is an 
ongoing debate on the risk of legal interference with the WTO framework. It also 
risks leading to considerable pressure on the trade relationship between the EU and 
third countries. From this perspective, it is worth recalling that Susan Schwab, the 
US  trade  representative,  has  already  warned  the  EU  that  its  unilateral  climate 
legislation might provoke retaliation.
53  
                                                                      
53 Beattie, Alan, Green barricade: Trade faces new test as carbon taxes go global. Financial Times, 23 January 
2008.                    
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6.5. Generating funds for climate change activities in developing countries  
 
A  fifth  and  final  element  relates  to  the  allocation  method  of  allowances  in  the 
reformed  ETS.  Following  the  controversy  around  free  allocation  in  the  first  two 
trading  phases
54,  the  Commission  proposes  to  make  auctioning  the  principal 
allocation method in the third trading period. Under the proposal, at least 20% of 
the revenues from auctioning - which are estimated at around 50 billion EUR per 
year - should be earmarked for climate change activities.
55 The revenues should not 
only be used for financing intra-EU activities (such as carbon capture and storage), 
but also for climate-related actions in developing countries, notably for "measures 
to avoid deforestation, in particular in Least Developed Countries and to facilitate 
developing  countries'  adaptation  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change".
56  The  ring-
fencing of the auction revenues, however, is the subject of a political battle as most 
Member States wish to maintain flexibility over the generated revenues.  
 
For  aviation  it  has  already  been  decided  that  a  percentage  of  auction  revenues 
could be allocated to climate change related activities in developing countries. But, 
also for this issue the most recent Council Conclusions on the EU’s position for the 
international negotiations “recall that it is for the Member States to determine, in 
accordance  with  their  constitutional  and  budgetary provisions,  how  the  revenues 
generated by the auctioning, from 2012 onwards, of 15 % of the EU ETS allowances 
for  aviation  are  to  be  used,  and  that  in  this  context,  they  undertake  to  combat 
climate change in the EU and third countries, inter alia to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions,  to  adapt  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change,  especially  in  developing 
countries, and to fund measures to avoid deforestation”.  
 
It is understandable that Member States want to retain fiscal sovereignty, but in the 
light of the crisis on the financial markets and expected economic downturn, it is 
difficult  to  see  where  the  considerable  funds  that  are  likely  to  be  needed  to 
convince India and China to join a post-2012 climate agreement, will come from. 
Let  alone,  that  these  funds  are  likely  to  be  needed  to  ensure  considerable 
reductions and changes to the energy infrastructure will actually materialise. For 
OECD governments, it already proves difficult to reach pledged increases of Official 
Development Aid funds. Seen from this perspective it would perhaps be better when 
(parts of the) future auctioning revenues would never become national income, but 
flow  into  an  international  fund  directly.  In  that  respect  the  2  %  levy  on  CDM 
transactions flowing automatically into the Adaptation Fund provides an interesting 
example. 
 
 
 
                                                                      
54 In the first periods, allowances were allocated for free to businesses. This has widely been recognised as one of 
the major flaws in the current design of the scheme. 
55 In its vote on 7 October, the Environment Committee of the European Parliament even indicated that 50 % of 
the auction revenues should be used to finance climate change activities in non-EU countries that have ratified the 
future international climate change agreement. 
56 Article 10(3) of the proposed Directive.   
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6.6. Uncertainties 
 
The  five  above-mentioned  elements  can  be  considered  as  signals  to  negotiation 
partners to join the EU's commitment to combating climate change. As such, the 
package  grants  the  EU  a  strong  mandate  for  the  post-Kyoto  negotiations.  Many 
questions remain however. How will the automatic scaling up of the 20 percent GHG 
reduction target to a 30 percent target take place in practice? Which institution is 
to decide whether the international agreement, if any, will be satisfactory? Will the 
European Parliament have a say in this? What if certain of the large GHG emitting 
countries do not participate? And, what will remain of the EU's ambitions in a worst-
case-scenario in which no post-Kyoto agreement is reached?   
 
Even  when  the  proposals  will  be  adopted  successfully  achieving  its  objectives, 
particularly  the  effort  sharing  targets,  will  depend  on  the  implementation  by 
Member  States.  The  increase  in  renewable  energy  that  is  foreseen  will  not  be 
sufficient to reach the greenhouse gas reductions that are required. Considerable 
energy efficiency improvements will be quintessential and these have proved the 
most difficult to adopt and implement in the past.
57 In order to avoid distortions of 
the internal market EU Member States will to a large extent be dependent upon new 
and strengthened EU regulations. An example is the proposed regulation to reduce 
emissions from cars, which has become subject to fierce negotiations which to a 
large extent have diluted the original ambitions for sharp reductions. Member States 
may  also  want  restore  to  the  use  of  subsidies  to  stimulate  investments  into  low 
carbon technologies. Whether they can reach their target in a cost-effective way 
will also to a large extent depend on factors more difficult to influence with (EU) 
government policies, such as technological breakthroughs and the price of oil. 
 
 
6.7. No time to waste 
 
The climate and energy package is certainly the most important political European 
dossier  of  the  last  months.  The  proposed  measures  will,  once  adopted,  have  a 
tremendous impact on each Member State’s environment, energy structure, industry 
and  economy  in  general.  The  economic  crisis  has  reinforced  the  impact  of  the 
package. It is therefore no surprise that each country wants to safeguard its national 
interests.  
 
The French government has made the adoption of the package the highest political 
priority of its EU Presidency. It has the difficult task of trying to find an agreement 
between  the  Member  States  on  the  one  hand  and  between  the  Council  and  the 
Parliament on the other hand before the end of 2008. The present economic context 
has further complicated the already troubled discussions as more and more claims 
are made to soften the proposed climate measures and to better protect European 
industry. As such, several key elements of the proposals, such as the auctioning of 
emission allowances to the energy sector, are being questioned by Member States
                                                                      
57 J. Henningsen (2008), EU energy and climate policy - two years on, EPC Issue Paper no. 55, September.                    
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and  political  groups.  At  the  time  of  writing  of  this  paper,  it  was  impossible  to 
predict the outcome of these negotiations.  
 
The  final  decision  on  the  package  would  ideally  have  to  be  taken  at  the  next 
meeting of European leaders on 11-12 December - a timing which coincides with the 
closure  of  the  international  climate  conference  in  Poznan.  In  any  case,  an 
agreement  should  be  found  in  early  2009  at  the  latest,  given  that  in  June  2009 
European  Parliament  elections  will  take  place  and  in  the  autumn  of  2009  a  new 
college of EU Commissioners is expected to commence work.  
 
Agreeing  on  the  package  is  not  only  of  vital  importance  for  the  EU’s  credibility 
towards its citizens, it will also determine to a large extent the EU's capacity to 
mobilise and influence its negotiation partners in the run-up to a post-Kyoto treaty. 
Any  failure  to  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  package  would  fundamentally 
undermine  the  EU's  negotiation  position  in  the  international  talks.  From  this 
perspective,  the  intra-EU  negotiations,  particularly  on  the  effort-sharing,  are  an 
important  test-case  for  the  international  post-Kyoto  negotiations.  It  will  show 
whether  and  how  the  EU  manages  to  reconcile  countries  with  diverse  economic 
backgrounds and different perceptions of the climate change problem in the current 
economic context. Given that these differences are even more explicit on a global 
scale, one can wonder how on earth a world-wide compromise would be possible in 
case the European countries cannot find an agreement among themselves.  
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
EU climate policy is perhaps the only EU policy in which the internal and external 
dimensions are so fundamentally and clearly intertwined. There is an intrinsic link 
between the domestic EU policy and the international climate regime, both from a 
regulatory and a diplomatic point of view. In regulatory terms the link between the 
ETS and the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms stands out. In terms of diplomacy, 
the use of the climate action and renewable energy package as a negotiation tool in 
the current negotiations, and its linkage to possible trade measures in case other 
countries will not follow the EU’s emission reduction ambitions draw attention.  
 
To  a  certain  extent  the  interwoveness  between  internal  and  external  climate 
policies should not surprise. Anthropogenic climate change is caused by greenhouse 
gas emissions emitted anywhere on earth and therefore the global level seems also 
to  be  the  most  appropriate  to  decide  upon  emission  reductions.  Without 
international backing EU policies will not make the difference, despite them also 
having other advantages such as diminishing fossil fuel related costs and security 
questions. It is praiseworthy that the EU seeks to strengthen its global leadership on 
climate policy through domestic EU policies, but  is dangerous  at the same time. 
Leading by example is only possible when the EU succeeds in adopting the climate 
action  and  renewable  energy  package  and  further  contingent  upon  its  successful 
implementation. When Copenhagen would not lead to a convincing outcome – which  
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is not unlikely given that the Summit may come too early for the  US – the EU’s 
policies may come under pressure.  
 
Although it is realised that climate change no longer is a soft policy issue, the way 
the EU decides upon its position and organises its external representation, makes it 
a relatively inflexible negotiator whose leadership changes every half a year. Such a 
system may not hold in case it is seriously challenged. Although the EU has provided 
strong  leadership  in  the  past  decade,  current  negotiations  may  require  a  more 
robust and diplomatic approach. Above all, the EU will have to prove its own ability 
to  adopt  the  climate  action  and  renewable  energy  package,  as  the  world  is 
watching.  
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